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TOWARD A FRAMEWORK STATUTE FOR SUPRANATIONAL
ADJUDICATION
Ernest A. Young*
The early decades of the twenty-first century may turn out to be the time
when supranational adjudication comes of age. Jenny Martinez recently
observed that “there are now more than fifty international courts, tribunals, and
quasi-judicial bodies, most of which have been established in the past twenty
years.”1 Curtis Bradley notes that “[i]ncreasingly, in terms of the subject
matters that they address and the ways in which they are structured,
international adjudicatory institutions are resembling traditional domestic
courts rather than simply interstate arbitral mechanisms.”2 And private
litigants are asking domestic courts to enforce the judgments of international
bodies with increasing frequency.3
The upshot is that while courses in International Law used to be a lot like
Constitutional Law, they will increasingly turn into Federal Courts.
Constitutional Law, after all, has most often been concerned with questions of
substantive right—Does the Due Process Clause protect abortion? Does the
Dormant Commerce Clause prohibit certain forms of state regulation of
business?—and International Law has frequently focused on similar questions
under both human rights and trade agreements. But with the advent of
supranational institutions that legislate, prosecute, and adjudicate, and the
concomitant need to manage the relationship between those institutions and
* Professor of Law, Duke Law School. This Essay was originally presented as part of the 2007
Randolph W. Thrower Symposium at Emory University School of Law. I am grateful to Robert Ahdieh and
the Emory Law Journal for the opportunity to participate, and to Duy Tran for helpful research assistance.
1 Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 430 (2003); see
also Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: The Hegemony of
Process, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (“This is a golden age for international dispute
resolution. There are more courts covering more topics with more cases than ever before.”). For a useful
schematic, see CESARE P.R. ROMANO, THE PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY IN CONTEXT: A SYNOPTIC CHART (2004), http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/
synoptic_chart/Synop_C4.pdf.
2 Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV.
59, 97 [hereinafter Bradley, Judicial Power]; accord Mark L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments, 48
VA. J. INT’L L. 65, 66 (2007).
3 See generally Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (2006) (discussing a rising tide of attempts to domestically enforce international tribunals’ judgments).
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parallel institutions at the national level, International Law seems likely to
become increasingly preoccupied with managing jurisdictional conflicts and
developing rules for remedies and choice of law—the bread and butter of the
domestic course in Federal Courts.4
International institutions with authority to legislate, prosecute, and
adjudicate of their own volition necessarily raise questions about due process,
judicial independence, and the delegation of authority ordinarily exercised by
domestic governments. How those questions are answered will, in turn, affect
more basic constitutional values of federalism, separation of powers,
democratic accountability, and procedural fairness. One way to approach these
questions is to measure the new supranational arrangements against domestic
constitutional norms that guarantee fair procedure, separation of powers, and
democratic accountability. In the United States, those norms include a general,
if not-very-lively, principle of non delegation as well as several more specific
principles, such as the textual strictures of the Due Process and Appointments
Clauses and doctrinal limits on the allocation of federal judicial authority to
non-Article III courts. Much good work has been done along these lines.5 But
these domestic constitutional provisions and principles were originally framed
to address quite different problems, and they have evolved over time in ways
that reflect largely domestic concerns. The awkwardness of bringing them to
bear on contemporary supranational judicial institutions is reflected in Henry
Monaghan’s recent way of framing the question: “Does the ‘ancient
Constitution’ of 1789, particularly its Third Article, and of 1791, particularly
its Due Process Clause, impose any real limits upon the new, wholly
unanticipated, supranational adjudicatory developments?”6 It is unsurprising
that, having framed the question in this way, Professor Monaghan concludes

4 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER]. For a much more extended application of the “Federal Courts” paradigm to international
adjudication, see Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J.
1143 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Institutional Settlement].
5 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-SelfExecution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International
Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); Edward T. Swaine, The
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492 (2004); John C. Yoo, The New
Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15
CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1998).
6 Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 842
(2007).
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that “any difficulties created by the Constitution for the emerging adjudicatory
order will prove to be rather small beer.”7
I want to try a different approach in this Essay. While remaining agnostic
about whether any given supranational regime violates the specific
constitutional principles discussed in the existing literature, I agree that those
principles map rather awkwardly onto the real concerns we have (or ought to
have) about supranational institutions. In this sense, I think David Golove is
right when he suggests that “[t]he considerations that are relevant to structuring
the forms of domestic democratic government can provide at best only a
starting point in thinking about how to structure . . . relationships . . . with
other sovereign nations for the purpose of carrying out cooperative projects
serving mutual interests and addressing common concerns.”8 What I propose
here is a set of statutory principles to regulate the delegation of authority to
supranational adjudicatory institutions. Because they are formulated as a
legislative proposal, these principles need not be teased out of constitutional
provisions and doctrines formulated long ago for entirely different purposes.
Our entrenched Constitution has long left considerable room for institutional
innovation with respect to both foreign relations and, on the domestic side,
managing the relations between two parallel systems of courts. We ought to
use that flexibility to talk directly about how the interface between domestic
and supranational courts ought to be structured.
I hasten to add, of course, that my particular proposals are tendered in the
most tentative possible way. Hopefully, they will at least serve as a starting
point for fruitful discussion of how we might integrate supranational
adjudication into our existing judicial system.
I. THE CASE FOR A FRAMEWORK STATUTE
Scholars of constitutional law are often criticized for focusing too much on
courts, to the exclusion of other institutional actors—legislators, executive
actors, even “the People Themselves.”9 One consequence of this judicial focus
7

Id.
David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1701 (2003). As will be clear, however, I do think that domestic
constitutional experience will often be relevant in determining how to structure supranational adjudicatory
institutions.
9 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 7–8 (2004) (emphasizing the role of the People); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
8
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is to take the non-constitutional law—the object of constitutional review—
essentially as given; constitutional analysis tends to enter at the stage of the
judiciary’s “sober second thought,” when legislative or executive policy has
already been formulated.10 Notwithstanding the oft-heard critique that our
Constitution is too difficult to amend so as to take account of new
developments,11 constitutional scholarship is forever inventing new doctrines
or adapting old ones to deal with the problems of the day. We take the law on
which those constitutional doctrines will operate—for present purposes, our
existing supranational organizations and the implementing legislation that
governs how those organizations operate on the domestic legal system—as
relatively fixed.
This judicial review orientation likely has a number of causes. Most
constitutional scholars are lawyers by training, and we tend to see
constitutional issues as courts see them. We are also likely to perceive the
courts as “forums of principle”12 that may be influenced simply by making a
good argument, whereas legislative or executive action often depends on the
mobilization of political forces to which scholars rarely have access. It may
not actually be easier to convince a court to strike down the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on delegation grounds than it would be get
Congress to amend the treaty’s implementing legislation, but the processes by
which one would go about pursuing the former course are certainly more
familiar to most constitutional scholars than those involved in pursuing the
latter.
The more basic cause, however, may have to do with a sense of the division
of labor between constitutional and non-constitutional law. In the conventional
view, constitutional law sets the boundary on a range of permissible legislative
choices, but it has virtually nothing to say about how choices within this
bounded area ought to be made.13 For example, the delegation doctrine—if it

CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (discussing the construction of
constitutional meaning in the political branches).
10 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 25–26 (1962); cf. William B. Fisch & Richard S. Kay, The Constitutionalization of Law in the United
States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 458–61 (1998 Supp.) (arguing, conversely, that constitutionalizing legal
questions tends to judicialize them as well).
11 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES
WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 159–66 (2006).
12 See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981).
13 See GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 15 (2002) (observing that modern
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even exists anymore, and if it applies to supranational delegations—requires
that U.S. treaty-makers provide an intelligible principle for supranational
delegatees to follow;14 Article III and the Appointments Clause may also place
certain aspects of federal judicial and executive power off limits to
delegation.15 But as the metaphor of a boundary or frame suggests, these
constraints nibble round the edges of the more basic problems: Precisely how
much authority should supranational institutions exercise? And how should
they be structured? Given the capacious nature of the limits imposed by the
delegation doctrine and the textual limits just mentioned, constitutional
lawyers may have to shrug their shoulders when we come to these more basic
questions.
I suggest that we broaden our conception of “constitutional” law.16 The
primary function of a constitution is to “constitute” the government—to
establish institutions, confer powers upon them, set the boundaries of their
jurisdiction, and define rights that individuals may possess against government
action.17 In some legal systems, such as the British, whatever laws perform
these functions are considered part of “the Constitution.”18 And although the
American system limits that appellation to a particular document that is
constitutional lawyers tend “to see politics as working within a constitutional order rather than working out that
constitutional order”).
14 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). As the Court noted in American Trucking, “[i]n the
history of the Court we have found the requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two statutes,” id. at 474,
and “we have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law,’” id. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). As Curtis Bradley has recently noted, there are good
reasons to think that the delegation doctrine might have more purchase when applied to delegations of judicial
authority and when those delegations are to actors outside the domestic governmental process. See Bradley,
Judicial Power, supra note 2, at 87–89. But even a more rigorous delegation principle would most likely leave
a considerable range of institutional arrangements open to U.S. treaty-makers, and it is worth focusing on the
constitutive questions existing within that range of constitutionally-permissible options.
15 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding that the
1978 Bankruptcy Act violated Article III by delegating judicial duties to non-Article III bankruptcy judges);
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (construing treaty to avoid constitutional
questions that would arise if the treaty-makers had delegated binding rulemaking authority to a supranational
body).
16 See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007)
[hereinafter Young, Outside the Constitution].
17 See ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 3–6 (2003); Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of
Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 153–54
(Larry Alexander ed.,1998) (identifying seven features that define constitutions).
18 See TOMKINS, supra note 17, at 7–14; see also Matthew S.R. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism to
Identify the Complete Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 587 (2006)
(discussing the constitution of New Zealand).
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uniquely entrenched against change, it remains the case that most of the legal
rules that constitute our government—that is, the legal rules that establish and
limit our governmental institutions—exist outside the canonical text.19 The
organic statutes establishing the various federal administrative agencies, the
Judiciary Acts that establish and delimit our judicial system, and the House and
Senate rules for vetting and voting upon legislation—all of these are examples
of our “constitution outside the Constitution.”20
This phenomenon is nowhere more salient than in the law governing the
foreign relations of the United States. The canonical Constitution has
relatively little to say about the conduct of foreign affairs.21 The dominant
separation of powers principle in the area, articulated by Justice Jackson in the
Steel Seizure Case,22 makes executive power largely a function of
congressional action. According to Justice Jackson’s scheme, the President’s
power is at its maximum when he acts with authorization from Congress, and
at its minimum when he contravenes a legislative command.23 For this reason,
as Harold Koh has observed, foreign affairs powers are allocated through
“framework statutes” such as “the Judiciary Act of 1789, the National Security
Act of 1947, the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the National Emergencies Act of 1976,
and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977.”24 Dean Koh
defines such statutes as “laws that Congress enacts and the president signs
within their zone of concurrent authority, not simply to ‘formulate policies and
procedures for the resolution of specific problems, but rather . . . to implement
19

See generally Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
See generally Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 16.
21 See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67 (1990) (“One cannot read the Constitution without being struck by its astonishing
brevity regarding the allocation of foreign affairs authority among the branches.”).
22 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668–69 (1981) (adopting Justice Jackson’s
analysis). The other crucial separation-of-powers case in foreign affairs law, United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), focused more on abstract political theory than on statutory frameworks
governing the conduct of foreign relations. Justice Sutherland’s elaborately theoretical opinion seemed to
ground national power in foreign affairs not so much in the Constitution itself but in pre-constitutional notions
of powers inherent in sovereignty—a “constitution outside the Constitution” indeed. See generally Sarah H.
Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127 (1999). More
importantly, however, the actual result in Curtiss-Wright was to affirm Congress’s power to reallocate foreign
affairs powers to the President through statutory delegation. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318–23. That
result is entirely consistent with Youngstown’s notion that the boundary between legislative and executive
power is defined through legislation.
23 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
24 KOH, supra note 21, at 69.
20
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constitutional policies’” such as the separation of governmental powers in
foreign affairs.25 Framework statutes “constitute” institutions and procedures
of government in much the same way that the Constitution itself does.26
The Supreme Court dramatically underlined the importance of such statutes
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld27—one of the most vitally important foreign affairs
cases in a generation. The critical issues in Hamdan involved interpreting not
the Constitution itself, but the Uniform Code of Military Justice,28 the postSeptember 11, 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force,29 and the Geneva
Convention on Treatment of Prisoners of War.30 Hamdan vividly illustrates
the extent to which critical constitutional boundaries, such as the line between
executive and legislative authority over suspected war criminals, are defined
by statute and treaty rather than by the text of the canonical Constitution.31
Thinking of the Constitution in this more capacious sense ought to lead
constitutional scholars past an exclusive focus on judicially enforceable
constraints on political action that are grounded in the canonical document. An
international agreement like the NAFTA or the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement, as well as the domestic legislation implementing such
agreements, performs a constitutional function: It creates institutions with the
authority to make law and resolve disputes, much like Articles I and III of the
Constitution do.
These institutional arrangements, in turn, implicate
constitutional values of separation of powers, federalism, democratic
accountability, and individual rights. It makes sense, in other words, to think

25 Id. (quoting Gerhard Casper, The Constitutional Organization of the Government, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 177, 187 (1985)).
26 See Casper, supra note 25, at 187–93 (discussing the role of framework legislation). The key
difference, of course, is that such legislation is not entrenched against change to the same extent as
constitutional provisions. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 16, at 426–28, 448–61 (discussing
the entrenchment issue). Elizabeth Garrett’s important recent work on framework legislation uses the term in a
somewhat narrower sense, limited to statutes affecting the processes of deliberation and voting within
Congress itself. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 294 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi
Kahana eds. 2006).
27 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
28 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006).
29 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
30 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
31 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2050–52 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of legislative enactments in
construing the scope of presidential authority); Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 16, at 436–42
(discussing Hamdan).
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of the design, interpretation, and administration of such agreements as raising
constitutional issues, whether or not we think that canonical provisions and
principles, like the Appointments Clause or the delegation doctrine, require or
forbid international agreements to be structured in particular ways.
Constitutional lawyers have generally eschewed questions of institutional
design, except on the rare and heady occasions when one is flown in to consult
on a new constitution for some exotic island republic in the South Pacific. As
I’ve already suggested, that omission stems from our tendency to see
constitutional law as a set of hard-wired, largely immutable constraints on
institutions rather than as extending to the structure and content of ordinary
legislation within those constraints. But if ordinary legislation—like the
NAFTA—frequently plays constitutive roles and implicates constitutional
values, then the design of such institutional arrangements is itself a question on
which constitutional lawyers may have something useful to say.32 We need not
focus simply on the constitutional constraints on the structure and operation of
supranational institutions because the design of such institutions is itself, at
bottom, a question of constitutional law.
II. WHAT THE STATUTE SHOULD SAY
In proposing a framework statute to govern the relationship between
domestic and supranational courts, it will help to have a specific example in
mind. I focus here on investor arbitrations under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA,
which requires signatory countries to abide by important substantive
limitations in their treatment of foreign investors.33 Unusually, Chapter 11
provides a private right of action for investors against signatory states for
violations of their treaty.34 Such cases are tried to an arbitral panel chosen by

32 See generally Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 16 (suggesting that constitutional scholars
should more broadly engage issues of institutional design).
33 See NAFTA, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993). Chapter 11
requires signatory countries to afford “national treatment” to investors from other signatory countries, art.
1102; to abide by a nonrelative “minimum standard of treatment,” requiring that investors be treated “in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security,” art.
1105; and to avoid nationalization or “expropriation” of investments, art. 1110.
34 See id. art. 1116. Although Chapter 11’s private right of action remains somewhat unusual, direct
private access to international dispute resolution seems to be waxing in importance across the domain of
international law. See, e.g., Borgen, supra note 1, at 4 (“The dominant form of international dispute resolution
has shifted from State versus State tribunals to mechanisms that allow non-State actors . . . to claim rights
under international law and access fora to resolve conflicts concerning those rights.”). The structural problems
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the parties.35 The decisions of these panels are binding on the parties, but the
U.S. implementing legislation specifically provides that panel decisions have
no direct domestic legal effect absent implementing measures by the U.S.
political branches.36 Christopher Borgen reports that, “[s]ince 1995, there have
been about thirty-five NAFTA claims, roughly evenly split with Mexico, the
United States, and Canada as defendants.”37
I want to propose, for purposes of discussion, amendments to both the
underlying agreement and the American implementation legislation.
Amendments to the agreement would replace the current system of arbitration
panels with a permanent supranational court, having the following
characteristics:
1. Nine members, three appointed by each of the signatory nations.
2. Judges would be required to have served previously on a national court
of generalist jurisdiction (i.e., not a specialty court like the Federal
Circuit or the Court of International Trade).
3. Judges would serve twelve year terms, subject to good behavior.
4. The authority of the court would be limited to answering questions
certified to them by the national courts of the signatory nations.
5. Hearings in the supranational court would be open to the public.
6. Majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions would be published.
7. Opinions of the supranational court would have precedential effect for
future deliberations by that court.

presented by private rights like Chapter 11 are thus likely to be increasingly salient even outside the NAFTA
context.
35 See NAFTA, supra note 33, art. 1120 et seq.
36 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2) (2006) (“No State law, or the application thereof, may be declared
invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with the
[NAFTA] agreement, except in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or
application invalid.”). For a sampling of the debate over Chapter 11, see, for example, Guillermo Aguilar
Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L
L. 365 (2003); Renée Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice System in an
Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229; Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs
Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at A20; and PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE
CASES: BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY i–xi (2001), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF186.PDF.
37
Borgen, supra note 1, at 15. Professor Borgen also notes that “[a]s of September 2007, the United States has
not lost any cases under NAFTA Chapter 11.” Id. at 16 n.72. But there have been some very close calls. See,
e.g., Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 I.L.M. 85 (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002); Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003); Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1170–77 (describing the
Mondev and Loewen cases).
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The proposal would also amend the U.S. implementing legislation giving
domestic effect to the NAFTA. The amendments would provide as follows:
1. Except as superseded by valid federal legislation, provisions of the
NAFTA would have direct effect in domestic courts. Private rights of
action under Chapter 11 would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal courts.
2. In any case in which the NAFTA is invoked, and the correct application
of the NAFTA is not clearly established under existing precedent, the
domestic court would be required to certify the relevant questions to
the supranational NAFTA court.
3. Upon receipt of an answer to the certified questions, the domestic court
would be required to defer to the NAFTA court’s interpretation, so long
as the domestic court finds the NAFTA court’s interpretation to be
reasonable.
4. In any case in which the NAFTA is invoked by a party, the domestic
court would be required to furnish notice to the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR), and to afford the USTR an opportunity
to intervene in the proceedings or participate as amicus curiae if it
should so desire.
5. If the interpretation of the NAFTA offered by the USTR should conflict
with the opinion of the NAFTA court, then the domestic court should
decide for itself which is the more reasonable interpretation of the
agreement.
These proposals are meant to operationalize three positions that I developed
in a more abstract form in earlier work. First, the proposals shift from a status
quo in which the supranational court has exclusive jurisdiction to consider
questions under an international agreement to a concurrent jurisdiction model
in which domestic courts play a primary role.38 Second, they make clear that
the international agreement is “shared law”39 among the various national and
supranational courts with jurisdiction to construe it; no single court enjoys
interpretive supremacy over the others.40 Third, they endeavor to address some
of the institutional weaknesses that currently plague supranational tribunals
under the NAFTA.41 The remainder of this Essay briefly summarizes my
reasons for resolving these issues as I have in the proposal.
38
39
40
41

See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1221–29.
Id. at 1229.
See id. at 1229–36.
See id. at 1243–48.
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A. Concurrent Jurisdiction
The current implementing legislation for the NAFTA (and for the WTO)
takes great pains to “wall off” the domestic legal system from decisions by
supranational tribunals.42 Those decisions have no direct effect on domestic
law absent further action by the U.S. political branches.43 This arrangement is
intended to protect U.S. sovereignty from international actors. Hence,
“‘[c]onstitutionalist’ or ‘revisionist’ scholars” of foreign affairs law, for whom
domestic sovereignty remains a central value, “generally advocate political
branch rather than judicial control over the domestic implementation of
international legal obligations.”44 The fear is that if domestic courts are
allowed to construe international obligations without specific authorization by
the political branches, those courts will become, in Richard Falk’s terms,
“agents of the international order.”45
Many scholars view Professor Falk’s vision as a desirable one, and they
have accordingly proposed engaging national courts in the enforcement of
international law in ways that the NAFTA implementing legislation
forecloses.46 One might also object to such provisions from a more nationalist
perspective, however. Even though they are designed to insulate the domestic
legal system from supranational decisions, “walling off” measures seem
unlikely to do so effectively. Once a supranational tribunal has found a U.S.
policy to violate the NAFTA, the national political branches will face heavy
pressure to take action to accommodate U.S. law to the requirements of the
international agreement, as interpreted by the supranational court.47
If we believe that supranational decisions will, as a practical matter, exert
an important influence over the domestic legal system, then the NAFTA
implementing statute has a crucial drawback. By prohibiting domestic courts
from construing and applying the agreement, it effectively forecloses those

42

Id. at 1229.
See supra note 36.
44 Bradley, Judicial Power, supra note 2, at 59–60.
45 RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 72 (1964).
46 See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 66–69 (2004).
47 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527, 534–
36 (2003); see also George A. Bermann, Constitutional Implications of U.S. Participation in Regional
Integration, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 478 (Supp. 1998) (observing that, notwithstanding similar legislation
foreclosing direct effect for WTO rulings, “the executive branch has shown its readiness to comply with
adverse WTO rulings”).
43
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courts from influencing the developing interpretation of the agreement.48 That
leaves the treaty to be construed exclusively by supranational or foreign actors
who may or may not have perspectives sympathetic to our own.49 Moreover,
the current legislation forces interpretation to occur in institutions cut off from
local conditions, rather than in domestic courts sensitive to the day-to-day
pragmatics of the domestic legal environment.50
Denying the domestic courts the power to construe and apply international
law is a departure from the main thrust of past practice. As Professor
Monaghan has noted, “American courts have had a long history of enforcing
international legal norms, but in so doing they have generally determined the
content of that law for themselves, as well as its domestic consequences.”51
The Supreme Court recently insisted on the right of domestic courts to “say
what the [international] law is” in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,52 which
addressed whether domestic courts were bound by the International Court of
Justice’s (ICJ) interpretation of a treaty:
If treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal
system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law “is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,”
headed by the “one supreme Court” established by the
Constitution . . . . Nothing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ
suggests that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on
our courts.53
Under the NAFTA implementing legislation, of course, Congress quite
deliberately denied domestic courts this power to give the NAFTA “effect as
federal law” and, in the process, to determine the NAFTA’s meaning.
There are reasons to believe that the American judiciary may offer a
valuable perspective on the sort of property rights and free trade protections
48 Cf. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (considering the authority of state courts to apply
federal law as an important aspect of state sovereignty).
49 See, e.g., Movsesian, supra note 2, at 93 (noting that “international courts lack the ties of civic identity,
history, and legal culture that often make the decisions of domestic courts acceptable to national
communities”).
50 See id. at 94–95.
51 Monaghan, supra note 6, at 843; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326 cmt. b (1987) (“The [national] courts . . . have the final say as to the
meaning of an international agreement insofar as it is law of the United States applicable to cases and
controversies before the courts.”).
52 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
53 Id. at 2684; see also Movsesian, supra note 2, at 108–09 (refuting claims in the Sanchez-Llamas
dissent that past decisions had deferred to the ICJ).
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embodied in the NAFTA. In particular, our courts’ institutional experience
with open-ended principles of freedom of contract54 and burden analysis under
the dormant Commerce Clause55 could inject an important note of caution in
the development of judicial review under free trade regimes. The more basic
point, however, is a nationalist one: International law seems more likely to
develop in ways that are not to our liking if our courts do not participate in the
enterprise.
To be sure, provisions denying domestic courts the authority to construe
international law directly do guard against Falkian co-option of the national
judiciary by guaranteeing a “democratic filter” for international norms.56 The
alternate risks of nonparticipation and co-option must be weighed against one
another, but there is no reason to think that the balance will tip in the same
direction in each discrete area of international cooperation. One virtue of the
statutory approach advocated here—as opposed to formulating a general
principle that domestic courts always or never get to apply international
norms—is that it can be fine-tuned to maximize domestic judicial participation
in those areas where the political branches think domestic courts can influence
the development of international norms in ways that reflect U.S. interests. In
those areas where direct application of international norms is likely to
empower domestic courts to avoid the constraints of national law and politics,
by contrast, domestic jurisdiction can be constrained more narrowly.
The proposal confers exclusive federal court jurisdiction to hear private
rights of action under Chapter 11, reflecting the conventional assumption that
guaranteeing a federal forum better promotes uniform and respectful treatment
of foreign litigants.57 I have made no effort to exclude the possibility of state

54 Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law regulating
the hours of bakers as an unreasonable legislative interference with freedom of contract), with Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The day is gone when this Court used the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”).
55 Compare, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (striking down an Iowa
statute limiting the length of trucks on state highways on the ground that it imposed an excessive burden on
interstate commerce), with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“I do not know what qualifies us to make . . . the ultimate (and most ineffable) judgment as to
whether, given importance-level x, and effectiveness-level y, the worth of the statute is ‘outweighed’ by
impact-on-commerce z.”).
56 See Bradley, Judicial Power, supra note 2, at 103.
57 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 426 (citing uniformity and concerns about a lack of parity
between state and federal courts as the most frequent reasons to create exclusive federal jurisdiction). This
assumption is reflected in the provision for alienage jurisdiction in Article III, for example. Whether the
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court jurisdiction entirely, however. Such an effort would require special
removal provisions, for example, whenever a foreign investor raised NAFTA
obligations as a defense to the enforcement of a state regulation. As I have
demonstrated elsewhere, the Framers of Article III were at pains to make a
federal forum available in most cases involving foreign nationals, but they did
not make federal jurisdiction exclusive, and they plainly contemplated that the
state courts would hear important classes of cases implicating foreign affairs
interests.58
Indeed, it would be plausible to scrap the proposal’s provision for exclusive
jurisdiction over NAFTA-created claims in favor of concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction over all NAFTA matters.59 As Judith Resnik has pointed
out, state (and local) institutions are increasingly playing a role in the
formulation and dissemination of international law.60 Simply as a practical
matter, there are international agreements that will become dead letters in the
absence of state judicial enforcement. Full protection of the right of foreign
nationals accused of crimes to consult their consulate,61 for example, will
surely require enforcement by state courts hearing prosecutions in the first
instance. As the volume of investor disputes under trade agreements grows,
availability of a state forum might likewise prove a boon to treaty enforcement.
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, a state court role in interpreting federal
law serves important diffusion-of-power values.62 A significant degree of
uniformity would remain attainable through the U.S. Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.63

assumption is actually warranted under current conditions is, of course, a complex empirical question that I
cannot hope to address here.
58 See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L.
365, 426–31 (2002).
59 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 427 (noting that concurrent state and federal jurisdiction,
subject to a right of removal to federal court, is the most common jurisdictional configuration for federal
claims).
60 See Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking
Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY
L.J. 1 (2007).
61 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, art. 36;
see also Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1164–70 (describing problems arising with respect to
the enforcement of this treaty).
62 See Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs Removal, and
Complete Preemption, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2007).
63 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006).
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B. Dualism and Shared Law
The proposed NAFTA regime would allow multiple courts, both national
and supranational, to interpret the agreement without according interpretive
supremacy to any single tribunal.64 It would encourage the supranational court
to play a coordinating role by requiring that domestic courts certify doubtful
questions and defer to the supranational court’s answers. To an extent, the
proposed NAFTA court’s role is analogous to that of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), which hears “preliminary references” of European law questions
arising in cases in the national courts.65 The proposal departs from the ECJ
model, however, by denying the NAFTA court power to bind national courts.66
By leaving domestic courts the option to disagree with the NAFTA court,
the proposal follows the “dualist” approach of Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
opinion in Sanchez-Llamas.67 On the other hand, the proposal would not treat
the NAFTA court’s interpretation of the treaty as having only persuasive
authority. Rather, the supranational decision would have independent
weight—albeit not conclusive weight—in addition to the persuasive force of its
reasoning.68 In this sense, the proposal resembles Justice Breyer’s comitybased dissent in Sanchez-Llamas, which seemed to place independent value on
respecting the ICJ’s judgment above and beyond the persuasive force of ICJ’s
arguments.69
Under the proposal, supranational interpretations are

64 To the extent that state courts interpret the NAFTA as described in the preceding section, they would
be bound by interpretive decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. For domestic purposes, after all, NAFTA is
federal law.
65 See Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 234 (ex art. 177), Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340)
173 (1997); Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme Court Review of State
Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Judicial Federalism, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 421, 425–26 (1996).
66 See Cohen, supra note 65, at 421 (noting that “a preliminary ruling by the European Court is a
supreme rule of decision for the courts of Member States”); GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL,
WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ELEANOR M. FOX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 354 (2d ed.
2002).
67 See 126 S. Ct. at 2684 (denying that ICJ rulings are “conclusive on our courts”); Movsesian, supra
note 2, at 88–90 (characterizing the majority opinion in Sanchez-Llamas as “dualist” in its approach).
68 See generally Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148,
156 (2005) (arguing that a legal practice is “authoritative,” in the jurisprudential sense, if it “carries weight that
is independent of the underlying reasons for that practice”).
69 See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2705 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In sum, I find strong reasons for
interpreting the Convention as sometimes prohibiting a state court from applying its ordinarily procedural
default rule to a Convention violation claim. The fact that the ICJ reached a similar conclusion in LaGrand and
Avena adds strength to those reasons.”); see also Movsesian, supra note 2, at 101–03 (discussing Justice
Breyer’s dissent as an example of a “comity” model attributing authoritative weight to supranational
interpretations).
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authoritative but defeasible, and the national courts retain the final say as to
whether the presumption has been overcome.
The deference prescribed here is analogous to the deference that domestic
courts pay to administrative agencies under the Chevron doctrine.70 Indeed, I
would argue that in applying the statutory “reasonableness” test, domestic
courts should be less deferential than they are to domestic administrative
agencies under Chevron.71 This would reflect the fact that the scheme does not
delegate authority to the supranational court to act “with the force of law,”72 as
well as the lack of mechanisms of legislative oversight and executive control
that provide accountability for domestic agencies. In any event, it is also
important that domestic courts would retain control over the often vital
application of the agreement to the facts of individual cases.
The proposed framework would lack a single court with authority to
resolve conflicts in the interpretation of the international agreement. It thus
follows a “shared law” model, rather than one of interpretive supremacy.73
Any shared-law arrangement will raise concerns about maintaining the
uniformity of the underlying regime. But an interpretive hierarchy subjecting
the U.S. federal courts to appellate control by a supranational tribunal would
raise thorny doctrinal problems under Article III;74 more fundamentally, it
would put a great deal more pressure on the competence and legitimacy of the
supranational tribunal.
Probably the best-known example of shared law for American lawyers is
the general commercial law, or law merchant, which both federal and state

70 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (requiring courts to
defer to an agency’s constructions of a statute it administers if the statutory provision is ambiguous and the
agency’s construction is reasonable).
71 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of [an agency’s] judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.”); see also Monaghan, supra note 6, at 850 (suggesting that the “respectful
consideration” accorded by the Sanchez-Llamas court to the ICJ’s ruling was equivalent to Skidmore
deference). The problem with Skidmore deference as an alternative, of course, is that it “can mean all things to
all people.” Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
72 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (limiting Chevron deference to
those circumstances in which Congress has delegated to the agency authority to act with “the force of law”);
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (same).
73 See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1229.
74 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (3 Dall.) 8 (1792) (suggesting that Article III forbids subjecting the
judgments of federal courts to revision by actors outside the federal judicial branch).
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courts applied under the regime of Swift v. Tyson.75 Experience under that
regime suggests that multiple courts can maintain acceptable levels of
uniformity even in the absence of a single appellate arbiter with authority to
resolve conflicts, so long as the subject matter is limited in scope and one court
is able to play a coordinating role.76 The proposal is designed to meet those
criteria in the context of the NAFTA: the subject matter is limited to
interpreting the NAFTA itself, and even a watered-down version of Chevron
deference should be sufficient to enable the supranational tribunal to guide and
coordinate interpretations by domestic courts. The uniformity problem
obviously becomes more difficult if we seek to generalize to contexts
involving more national players and substantively broader agreements.77
More fundamentally, any dualist approach leaving national courts with
authority to reject supranational interpretations is likely to draw charges of
This is likely true notwithstanding the proposal’s
parochialism.78
incorporation of presumptive deference to the NAFTA court. Such concerns
may recede if I am right that national courts can maintain a generally high
level of uniformity under a shared-law regime. But at the end of the day,
“parochialism” is just a pejorative label for the view that national courts have
legitimacy advantages over supranational ones as well as superior expertise in
adapting international law to the domestic legal regime. I would need to see a
much more impressive track record for supranational courts than we have to
date before becoming willing to give those domestic advantages up. And to
the extent that such perceptions are widely shared in the domestic community,
dualism and shared law may be necessary to render the international project
acceptable. As Mark Movsesian points out, the dualist insistence on national
control may “minimize[] the occasion for nationalist backlashes that can only
lessen the beneficial influence of international courts.”79

75 41 U.S. (15 Pet.) 166 (1842). For an exploration of the operation of the general law regime, see
William Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984).
76 See Fletcher, supra note 75, at 1515; see also Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1233–
36 (applying Judge Fletcher’s analysis to the problem of supranational courts).
77 See infra Part III.
78 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Implementation and Compliance: Is Dualism Metastasizing?, 91 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 504, 517 (1997) (claiming that dualism rests upon “anachronistic . . . isolationism and
unilateralism”).
79 Movsesian, supra note 2, at 70.
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C. Restructuring the Supranational Court
My proposed replacement for the current system of arbitral panels is
designed to meet three frequent criticisms. The first is that trade panels,
typically composed of experts on the subject of international economic law, are
biased toward the promotion of free-trade values over other competing values,
such as environmental protection.80 That criticism resonates with the U.S.
federal judiciary’s traditional reluctance to create specialist courts.81 The
proposal seeks to address this problem by requiring that judges appointed to
the supranational tribunal have at least some judicial experience on a generalist
court.82
The second criticism is that NAFTA panel decisions are a ticket for this
day and train only. Because they sit to decide only a single case, they are
undisciplined by the prospect of having to live with the precedential force of
their rulings in future cases.83 Institutional continuity seems particularly
important in a period when supranational and domestic courts must work out
rules and doctrines governing their relations with one another; in such
circumstances, repeat players are more likely to take a balanced view of the
competing institutional imperatives and to invest time and other resources in
the development of workable interjurisdictional rules.84 Hence, the proposal
would constitute a permanent supranational court whose members serve
extended terms.
Finally, supranational institutions are often criticized for being
insufficiently transparent, both with respect to the selection of their

80 See, e.g., David W. Leebron, The Boundaries of the WTO: Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 5, 22 (2002)
(suggesting that WTO personnel will have a “natural inclination” to favor liberal trading rules over competing
values).
81 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 147–60 (1985) (opposing
proposals for specialized federal courts).
82 Some NAFTA panels under the current regime have, in fact, included generalist judges. The panel in
Loewen, for example, included not only Abner Mikva, a respected former judge of the D.C. Circuit, but also
Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the Australian High Court, and Lord Michael Mustill, a former
British law lord. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003). Loewen shows that the proposed requirement is unlikely to be a panacea, as
the panelists’ generalist backgrounds did not prevent them from showing an extraordinary lack of deference to
the state courts’ rulings in the case. See id.
83 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2099 (2004) (criticizing the lack of “‘institutional’ continuity” under NAFTA Chapter
11).
84 Id.; Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1245–46.
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membership and the processes by which they do business.85 As Curtis Bradley
notes, appointments to supranational courts typically do not have “nearly as
much transparency or public deliberation as with domestic judicial
appointments.”86 Moreover, serious concerns exist about national bias by
supranational judges.87 My proposed statute here would shift front-line
adjudicative authority to domestic judges who are publicly vetted and subject
to all sorts of domestic institutional constraints. The bias issue is more tricky,
of course: Using domestic courts avoids the problem of foreign judges
potentially biased against U.S. interests, but obviously creates a risk that
foreigners will distrust the decisions of national tribunals. It should at least
help on this score, however, that the domestic courts in this country have
considerable guarantees of judicial independence and a long record of
willingness to buck the interests of domestic political actors.88
On the process side, proceedings before NAFTA tribunals are not generally
public, and opinions can be hard to find. The proposal advanced here would
open hearings to the public and require publicly available written opinions. It
also discourages the phenomenon, common in some international and foreign
courts, of suppressing concurring and dissenting views. All of this is meant to
promote the discipline of written reason-giving and public criticism.89

85 See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 36, at 284–86 (criticizing the current rules limiting access to NAFTA
proceedings).
86 Bradley, Judicial Power, supra note 2, at 100 (citing Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International
Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 277–78
(2003)); see also Movsesian, supra note 2, at 92–93 (“Typically, international organizations far removed from
national communities appoint international judges. These organizations use selection procedures that are
opaque or even secretive . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34
J. LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005).
88 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (striking down the Bush Administration’s
policy of trying suspected terrorists before military commissions).
89 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1271, 1374–75 (1995) (emphasizing the discipline imposed on courts by the need to produce
reasoned written opinions). The more discursive nature of domestic opinions, in comparison to those of many
supranational tribunals, is not simply a function of transparency. Much of it may be attributable to differences
between the common law tradition of Anglo-American courts and the civil law roots of many supranational
institutions. Such gaps are unlikely to be easily bridged. To the extent that domestic rules of deference accord
only persuasive weight to supranational rulings, however, supranational tribunals might be encouraged to
spend more time explaining the rationale underlying their rulings.

YOUNG GALLEYS FINAL

112

2/15/2008 8:37:25 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57

III. BEYOND THE NAFTA
By focusing on NAFTA adjudication here, I have so far avoided the
difficult question of whether the law governing the relationship between
domestic and supranational courts should be agreement-specific, with different
arrangements for different treaty regimes, or general, with one framework
statute governing all interactions between domestic and supranational
tribunals. That is a difficult question, in part because some arrangements will
work best for agreements like the NAFTA, with a relatively small number of
parties that enjoy close relations, while others will be more appealing for
agreements among hundreds of less familiar parties. In the former case, treaty
partners may be more familiar with and willing to trust the U.S. domestic
courts to play a prominent role in dispute resolution, and the U.S. may be
willing to grant reciprocal concessions to the domestic courts of its partners.
Both dimensions of trust become considerably more doubtful as we proliferate
the number of parties to the supranational regime.
A general statute governing the role of domestic adjudication under
multiple treaty regimes would likewise have to confront the radical differences
that exist among supranational adjudicatory institutions.90 The level of
deference accorded to the supranational court’s interpretations of the
underlying treaty, for example, might need to vary considerably depending
upon the institutional characteristics of the particular supranational court at
issue.91 It makes little sense to accord the U.N. Human Rights Commission,
for example, the same degree of deference that we might give to the ICJ. One
might finesse the problem by instructing domestic courts to employ a flexible,
Skidmore-type rule that takes into account the institutional characteristics of
the particular international tribunal. To do that, however, is to largely sacrifice
any advantage of uniformity and predictability one might have hoped to gain
by drafting a general supranational adjudication statute.
A second, even more vexing question concerns whether the
interjurisdictional rules under a particular agreement must be the same for all
parties to the regime, or whether those rules may vary according to the
different capacities of the various domestic legal systems with which the
supranational adjudicator must interact. The Legal Process Tradition has long
90 These differences reflect an even more fundamental divergence in levels of legalization among
international norms in different areas. See Borgen, supra note 1, at 9.
91 See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43
VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 792 (2002).
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suggested that the allocation of decisionmaking authority should be, in large
part, a function of the institutional capacities of the relevant actors.92 From this
perspective, radical variations in the institutional capacities of different
domestic legal systems at least arguably should be reflected in different
interjurisdictional rules for each system.93 For much of the international law
community, on the other hand, this sort of variable deference regime smacks of
pernicious “double standards.”94 A more practical objection would be that,
given the immense diversity of domestic legal regimes, a set of injurisdictional
rules that purported to take account of variations in institutional capacity would
be incoherent.
It is hard to imagine that the work of constructing a viable set of
interjurisdictional rules can proceed without some effort to unify the field. In
domestic law, we generally do not have multiple abstention doctrines or habeas
corpus regimes that apply to different state judicial systems.95 And while
American administrative law does accord different degrees of deference to
different agencies in some circumstances,96 and the procedures required for
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act may vary according to
the organic statute governing each agency,97 there remains a sense that the field
functions best when it can be regarded as a coherent regime operating across
multiple subject matters. Indeed, one significant impediment to rational
discussion of the interjurisdictional problem in foreign affairs law today is that
the different regimes are so numerous and so various that few observers—
much less the people who have to negotiate, draft, and administer the
agreements—can claim the breadth and depth of knowledge to think
systematically about the field.98 Under the circumstances, drafting an
interjurisdictional statute to solve a narrower set of problems may be the best

92

See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 158 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
93 See generally Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1236–43.
94 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1485–86 (2003)
(characterizing the view that some domestic legal systems deserve more deference than others as a form of
American “exceptionalism”).
95 But see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (refusing to require Younger abstention where the
state judicial system offered an inadequate remedy); 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (2006) (providing expedited procedures
for habeas proceedings in capital cases, applicable only in states meeting certain federal criteria for provision
of effective defense counsel).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (deferring under Chevron only to
those agencies to whom Congress has delegated authority to act “with the force of law”).
97 See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 199 (3d ed. 2004).
98 The present author certainly makes no such claim.
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we can do, but that approach itself contributes to the proliferation of diverse
interjurisdictional regimes.
CONCLUSION
The proposal here, of course, is simply meant as a starting point for
discussion of what the relationship between supranational and domestic
judicial institutions ought to look like. The broader point is that such a
proposal may offer a readier step toward this ultimate question than a focus on
particular constitutional constraints on supranational delegation. I do not mean
to disparage the importance of such constraints or to suggest that such
constraints should not continue to bind us in our contemporary environment of
legal globalization. What I do suggest is that the broad question of
institutional design is also a constitutional question.
The usual focus on a fairly narrow set of constitutional objections to
supranational adjudication—e.g., the nondelegation doctrine and the
Appointments Clause—may be obscuring the extent to which basic
constitutional values are pervasively at stake in the design of supranational
institutions.
These values include federalism, separation of powers,
democratic accountability, and procedural fairness.
Any number of
institutional configurations might be constitutionally “permissible” in the sense
that no domestic court would strike them down, but that hardly means that
every possible configuration would serve these constitutional values equally
well. International law is “constituting” a new set of institutions on top of our
existing structures, much like the advent of the national administrative state
grafted a new set of institutions on top of the old Constitution in the last
century. It is time for constitutional scholars to stop nibbling round the edges
of the supranational project and give their full attention to the constitutional
design issues at its core.

